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Abstract 
 
This article examines the centrality of storytelling in achieving managerially relevant 
outcomes, with a focus on the in-situ performance context of corporate storytellers 
influencing one another.  The Ricœurian concept of speech act, capturing both the 
intentionality of organisational discourse and the social context of its production and 
reception, implicitly guided our research effort.  The article has at its core a story of how 
senior organizational officers exploited the volatile circumstances of a major public offer 
in Singapore. By looking at the social construction of narratives in their many fragments 
we come to see how a key protagonist carves out a position of power. The efficacy of his 
performances can be seen to be dependent upon the effective use of poetic tropes and the 
receptiveness of listeners to particular Chinese archetypal relationship-driven themes. In 
crafting our story we use multiple texts which were produced in and around two case 
organizations. As such we offer a carefully constructed collage, a mixture of production 
and reproduction, sticking closely to forms of communication that key organizational 
actors used to plan, enact and interpret their actions and those of others. Whilst our story 
offers insights to readers with an interest in organizational discourse, corporate 
governance and Asian management practices, we refrain from imposing an authoritarian 
interpretation that insists on identifying with the intentions of the authors. 
 
Contact: Christian De Cock (C.De-Cock@exeter.ac.uk) 
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Battle in the Boardroom: A Discursive Perspective 
 
Preamble 
Valentine’s Day 1995 was a watershed in Singapore corporate history. On this day, 
Antony, Singapore’s oldest company, launched a hostile takeover bid for Cleo, a “home-
grown success story” which was one of Singapore’s best known companies1. The 
hostility of Antony’s bid surprised the local market; analysts could not recall the last 
hostile takeover. The brazenness of Antony’s pursuit caught public attention: Cleo’s 
balance sheet was over twice the size of Antony’s and she employed eight times the 
number of Antony’s staff.  
 
To gain public support, Antony executed a meticulous public relations program which 
centered on the appointment of a new chairman for Cleo. Antony’s board of directors 
nominated a local Chinese entrepreneur with great public stature for this role. Given his 
public standing, the chairman was supposed to strengthen market credibility for the 
takeover. At the same time, Antony’s directors expected him to cement control of Cleo 
on Antony’s behalf. They thought they could control the chairman because he had served 
Antony loyally for many years. 
 
Initially the new chairman seemed to reward the faith invested in him as he began an  
“extensive program to review and restructure [Cleo’s] operations (Cleo Announcement, 
12/04/1995).” But appearances deceived. Behind a facade of corporate unity, Cleo’s new 
chairman initiated a power struggle to seize control of Cleo. He eventually took 
exclusive, personal control of Cleo and left Antony, the majority shareholder, without an 
effective voice in running Cleo.   
 
The public were never aware of any “battle in the boardroom”. Instead, public statements 
painted an official story of change as well organized and professionally managed with a 
successful outcome never in doubt. However, beneath this level of public perception 
several other storylines gave conflicting accounts of how Cleo’s restructuring was 
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progressing. These various storylines form the crux of our investigation as they point to 
the importance of discursive performances given by key protagonists in carving out 
positions of power. 
 
Framing the study 
“The basic technology of organization is… a technology of narrative, as well as a 
technology of production.  The contested terrain of organizations is seen as a terrain of 
meaning (March, 1996, p. 286).” 
 
Our study can be firmly located within the “narrative mode” (Bruner, 1986, 1990) or 
“narrative paradigm” (Fisher, 1985). We take a distinctive position which locates us 
alongside a range of other writers who are interested in narrative as a way of expressing 
practical knowledge and understanding organizational processes (Barrett et al., 1995; 
Czarniawska, 1997; Keenoy et. al, 1997; Rhodes, 2000; Watson and Harris, 1999). 
Whereas in the logico-scientific mode of knowing an explanation is achieved by 
recognizing an event as an instance of a general law, or as belonging to a certain 
category; narrative knowledge tells of human projects and their consequences as they 
unfold over time, thus capturing the nuances of event, relationship and purpose that are 
often obscured in the traditional academic abstraction process (Czarniawska, 1998). 
Attention to time, motives and human agency help to preserve the situational particularity 
missing from propositional statements favored by the logico-scientific mode (Pentland, 
1999; Riessman, 1993). From a narrative viewpoint the traditional research interest in 
organizations as distinct entities gives way to a focus on organizations-embedded-in-
practices (Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997). It allows for the centrality of human beings as 
creators and interpreters of meaning in an organization and for narration and storytelling 
as valid and valued parts of organization studies (Wicks and Freeman, 1998).  
 
In this narrative turn the field of organization studies has mirrored developments in 
philosophy and social theory. Scholars such as MacIntyre (1985), Rorty (1991) and 
Taylor (1985) have been instrumental in promoting narrative as the basic and essential 
genre for the characterization of human actions. Although more precise definitions have 
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been suggested and debated, for our present purposes it is sufficient to think of narratives 
and stories as interchangeable terms, used here in the same sense that the terms are used 
in ordinary conversation2 (cf. Boyce, 1996; Rappaport, 1993). The terms “narrative” and 
“story” generally refer to thematic, sequenced accounts that convey meaning from 
implied performer/author to implied audience/reader (Barry and Elmes, 1997). In 
successfully identifying and understanding what organizational actors are doing, we 
always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative 
histories, both in terms of the individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act 
(MacIntyre, 1985). Thus we can conceive of narratives and stories as underpinning the 
never-ending construction of meaning in organizations.   
 
Weick (1995) pointed out that researchers are often handicapped when they try to make 
sense of organizational life, because their skills at using narratives for interpretation are 
not tapped by most traditional models of  organization. Yet most organizational realities 
are based on narration3. Thus the adoption of a narrative approach to knowledge in, and 
about, organizations may increase the relevance of organizational knowledge produced 
by academics. As Pentland suggested: “[T]he significance of narrative data lies not just in 
their richness and near universal availability, but in the fact that they are the same kind of 
data that organizational members use to plan, enact, interpret, and evaluate their own 
actions and those of others… Thus when we analyze narrative, we are starting with raw 
material that is central to the cognitive and cultural world of our subjects (Pentland, 1999, 
p.716).” 
 
Many well-known studies from the 1980s conceived of organizational stories or 
narratives as artifacts forever petrified in the organizational reality “out there” waiting to 
be “collected” (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). In the 1990s the field moved on to question 
these rather synthetic accounts based in “stories-as-objects” theory. The emphasis shifted 
to “stories-in-context” research, with a focus on both the in-situ performance context of 
storytellers influencing one another, and the historical context of local embeddedness of 
“micro” stories in wider “macro” stories (Boje, 1998). Boje (1991), in his study of an 
office supply firm, challenged the stories-as-objects tradition in collecting tape recordings 
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of stories told in-situ, and defined stories as partial, fragmented, and extended across 
multiple conversations involving many actors. In partial tellings, the collective combines 
to tell the fuller story, but across time and in different spaces. The implication is that 
researchers need to track stories across settings and capture its invocation even where few 
story features are visible: to look at glosses, terse tellings, and shifts in the telling of 
events to construct different power alignments. In Boje’s (1995) study of the Disney 
corporation, plots, meanings and characterizations change over time depending on whose 
viewpoint (old and new management, workers, journalists, etc.) stories were being told as 
well as revised. Czarniawska (1997) in her various studies on the transformation of 
organizations in the Swedish public sector, shows these organizations to be complex and 
dynamic webs of narratives. Just as in Boje’s work, narratives are viewed as constitutive 
of particular organizational realities, rather than mere measures of something else. 
Czarniawska makes the reader aware that “[A]lthough ‘narratives on organizations’, that 
is, organization studies, are usually stylized in the ‘only true story’ format, ‘narratives in 
organizations’, tales told in the field, are manifold and often ironic (p.26).” 
 
In the above studies the analysis of stories (Boje’s preferred term) and narratives 
(Czarniawska’s preferred term) is pursued as a means of revealing the indeterminacy of 
organizational experiences (cf. Keenoy et al., 1997). By looking at the social construction 
of narratives in their many fragments, with various performances telling multiple stories, 
these narratives are now seen to be fragmentary, intertextual (referring to narratives 
outside themselves), situated and strategic in nature (Pentland, 1999). Whilst earlier 
theorists tried to read into stories existing “out there”, the focus in these studies is on the 
dynamics of situated and contextualized storytelling. They take as object of investigation 
the story and its performance, not simply the content to which language refers. If we were 
to study narratives abstracted from their performance we would fail to see the connection 
between language, power, and social structure (Burkitt, 1998). Czarniawska’s and Boje’s 
studies are also characterized by their attention to the ownership of organizational stories. 
Understandings are seen to be quite disparate, negotiated, and hegemonic – hegemonic in 
the sense that some voices, interpretations, and stories are more privileged than others in 
subtle ways. As Boje et al. (1999) suggest: “Storytelling theory is all about who is in 
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control of the story –  who is shaping and influencing the story (p.354).” It is not about 
whose story is best, but who has the power to make a story stick as one that others will 
choose to live by or in. The power dimension of storytelling is implicit in the term 
“discourse”, defined as a historically contingent body of regularized practices of language 
that are condoned by a particular community (Casey, 1995; Prior, 1997). Indeed “we are 
all ‘effects’ of the power of discourse, we all move from one discursive network to 
another, always producing power relations (Calás and Smircich, 1999, p.657-658).”  
 
In crafting our research story we pick up on the themes of “performance” and “discourse” 
in the operational concept of discursive performances. We see discursive performances as 
exercises in power, with power defined as the capacity to extend hegemonic reach by 
suppressing or overwhelming competing accounts such that one’s own interpretation 
dominates (Brown, 2000). The concept is thus meant to capture both the hegemonic and 
performative aspects of linguistic actions. These actions are rooted in the sequences, 
patterns, and meanings that stem from exchanging verbal and nonverbal messages 
(Putnam et al., 1996) and may include orally transmitted narratives, the authoring of 
organizational and institutional texts, and even selective silences. Following 
Czarniawska, we will treat texts as actions (“strictly speaking, material traces of such, but 
they both result from and provoke further action”), and actions as texts: “Actions, 
especially institutionalized actions, produce texts; texts not only ‘fix’ other actions– their 
production and interpretation assume actions (Czarniawska, 1999, p.11).”  Even when 
fixed as text, organisational discourse retains many of the properties associated with 
speech acts, remaining closely bound to its authorial context and relying for its meaning 
on attributions of instrumental intent (Heracleous and Hendry, 2000).  Senior 
organizational actors will be seen to use a range of storytelling performances in the sense 
of producing narratives with simple but resonant plots, involving skill, entailing risk, and 
aiming to entertain, persuade, and win over various listener-stakeholders (cf. Gabriel, 
2000). We will look towards identifying conventionalized, patterned organizations of 
performances and will explore how performances are interpreted and evaluated by the 
performers’ intended audience (cf. Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).  
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Crafting the story 
Empirical foundations 
“[R]esearchers who want to use stories as a research instrument must be prepared to 
sacrifice at least temporarily some of the core values of their craft and adopt instead a 
rather alien attitude towards their subjects and their texts.  They must rid themselves of 
the assumption that quality data must be objective, reliable, accurate, etc. and must be 
prepared to engage personally with the emotions and the meanings that reside in the 
text… At the same time, researchers must not lose sight of the relation between stories 
and facts: facts are not dissolved by stories but re-created through them (Gabriel, 2000, 
p.135-136).” 
 
Most narratives do not just lie around in organizational situations nor do documents wait 
to be related. They have to be “authentically crafted and configured” (Golden-Biddle and 
Locke, 1997, p.19) from a variety of sources. In our research story we weave together 
direct field observation, interviews and systematic collection of textual data to unravel 
the contextual import of organizational stories, and the voices of these stories (Boje, 
1995; 1998). As such we offer a collage – a mixture of production and reproduction that 
every reading and writing necessarily entails (Czarniawska, 1999) – with the authorship 
of different pieces distinctly attributed. This does not mean that we try to efface our role 
or claim innocence from the representational force that we bring to this text. A good deal 
of selectivity stands behind any author’s decisions about what details to include, what 
organizing concepts to use, what events to highlight, and so forth (Van Maanen, 1998). 
Understandings that researchers present must ultimately be construed as factive fictions 
crafted from numerous sources and methods, influenced by the availability and quality of 
different materials, and designed to please both the researchers and the researchers’ 
audiences (Barry, 1996; Watson, 2000). 
 
In crafting our research story we have been particularly influenced by a growing body of 
text based research (Gephart, 1978, 1993; Brown, 2000; Brown and Jones, 2000). 
Organizational texts can be seen as contrived rhetorical products that contain implicit 
power dimensions, and which stifle potentially competing or contradictory storylines, 
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thus serving hegemonic and legitimation functions.  The texts produced in and around the 
two case companies that we collected and analyzed comprise: complete board minutes of 
Antony and Cleo covering an eighteen month period, inter-office memoranda, company 
announcements and prospectae, one officially released interview transcript, commentary 
from the Singapore press, and stockbroking analysts’ reports. These texts are 
complemented by texts we generated ourselves: the transcripts of two personal interviews 
with senior executives and a variety of retrospective fieldnotes. 
 
We concentrated on the viewpoints of senior managers because of the specific boardroom 
environment in which the related events took place, an environment in which only certain 
company representatives, principally directors, were allowed access. In this context, 
board minutes are of particular importance in providing structure and substance to our 
study because of their monopoly of meaning; aspects that are named and actions that are 
recognized in the minutes gain legitimacy and importance (Oakes et al., 1998). What gets 
documented as well as ignored can reveal “the most fundamental struggle for power and 
control” (Phillips and Hardy, 1997, p.171). This is not to suggest that board minutes 
provide a “true” representation of the underlying organizational reality they are supposed 
to reflect. Rather, we see them as material instruments in a power construction process. In 
forcing a particular closure on events and situations which are interpretively open ended, 
power is constructed, sustained and reproduced. Board mintues are certainly not self-
explanatory. As outsiders, researchers often lack contextual experience and are not 
therefore in a position to read insightfully into the apparently uncomplicated 
communicative intent of a formalized set of board minutes. Contextual experience is 
provided here by the first author who was a Cleo Group Executive Director as well as a 
non-executive director on Antony’s main board throughout the restructuring process and 
beyond. As one of Cleo’s most senior executive officers he participated in all board 
meetings and subcommittee meetings of the board covering the material period. 
 
Analysis of the textual data 
We approached our exploration of  the textual sources in two distinct stages. Firstly, we 
scanned the textual sources for stories, including snippets of stories which might be 
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embedded in “terse” format (Boje, 1991, p.115). We used the first author’s knowledge of 
depicted events to pick out snippets which, taken together, appeared to support a 
particular storyline although extracts in themselves did not necessarily constitute an 
intelligible story. We accordingly filled in the blanks of terse, apparently incomplete 
stories by bridging snippets of stories across time (mainly represented by different sets of 
board minutes) and across the two organizations. The second stage of our approach 
involved collating, reducing and coding identified micro-stories. We first sketched a 
“start list” of stories under narrative headings as we studied the texts and then developed 
the various storylines,  building up additional stories through subsequent re-readings. We 
highlighted interesting parts of texts with various codes which in one reading did not fit 
any particular storyline and returned to them after finishing reading the set of texts in its 
entirety. The codes reflected the level of stories which we identified from any one 
reading. From our narrative headings we built up various tables of narratives. For each 
narrative, we considered its relative “dominance” by gauging how key stakeholders of 
Antony and Cleo reacted to the respective stories.  
 
Concentrating on narrative headings (rather than, for instance, grouping texts by dates or 
by identified actors) was our means of “bridging” our textual data. This was because we 
knew there was always a follow-on concerning an identified story across time periods 
(given that Cleo’s restructuring was a stop-start process over an extended period) and 
across the corporate operating space of both Antony and Cleo (given that the two 
companies were closely related and that they therefore shared common stakeholders). So 
a story developed in one company would invariably also appear in textual sources 
belonging to the other company. We decided not to use text display/coding computer 
software because the language of our main sources was extremely terse and there was 
usually little or no explanation to things or people referred to. The reason was that the 
private papers were written for an informed, internal staff audience and accordingly a 
suitably informed interpreter was required to draw meaning out of extant texts. 
 
In developing our research story we needed several annotated readings to break the 
surface level of the official texts which were carefully couched in “neutral” language. We 
 9 
read into the multiple versions of organizational reality in order to reduce the importance 
of phenomena named as “important” in the official stories, whilst reconstructing other 
aspects that were ignored as unimportant. Thus, for example, whilst we noticed the 
“official story” of incremental, controlled change during the early transition stage of 
Cleo’s restructuring, we paid less attention to this storyline in our study of the texts. 
Instead, given our awareness of the impending power struggle, we focused on seeking 
evidence of internal, unpublicized stories involving Cleo's chairman, and on trying to 
make sense of these unpublicized stories in relation to later restructuring stages when the 
chairman’s narrative became clearly prominent. We therefore took less notice of gauging 
the accuracy of texts as a faithful record of what was actually said than of showing how 
the sources provided a consistent storytelling perspective which directors made sense of 
and on which basis they then developed appropriate action strategies.  
 
Introducing the story 
Company history 
Antony was originally a colonial trading house. It became quoted on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange in 1979. The company’s core competence was in providing mechanical and 
electrical engineering expertise for building projects. Antony also harbored a fast-
growing property development division which sought to reinvest its earnings in new 
property projects. It shot to prominence when it led the development of several landmark 
projects in the emerging markets of Indochina and Indonesia. 
 
Antony had a payroll of about 300 full-time employees who were mostly engineers or 
technical support staff. However, despite its entrepreneurism, Antony lacked the breadth 
of skills required to expand in the building industry; hence its interest in Cleo. 
 
Cleo’s expertise complemented Antony’s. Since its founding in the 1970s Cleo had 
become one of Asia’s largest civil engineering contractors, and it gained a quotation in 
1981. Cleo had an international reputation for alternative engineering solutions and it 
won numerous public awards with its ability to develop and apply innovative techniques. 
By the time of Antony’s bid, Cleo had developed a capability for turnkey design and 
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build which was a prestigious and lucrative market niche. This capability boosted Cleo’s 
value as a takeover target. 
 
Cleo employed over 2,000 staff including 400 civil engineers which made it the largest 
private employer of engineers in Singapore. What Cleo lacked was operating efficiency 
to match its technical competence; hence its apparent suitability as Antony’s partner.  
 
Synopsis of the takeover 
Antony had long held a significant shareholding interest in Cleo and had consistently 
shown that it wanted to play a bigger part in Cleo’s future. However, Cleo’s board of 
directors spurned Antony’s advances. Antony became frustrated: it had invested hugely 
in Cleo but received only one board seat. Antony’s directors soon hardened to the view 
that Antony had to take control of Cleo in order to protect its investment.  
 
Antony’s takeover offer lasted three weeks over February and March 1995. As Antony 
had already secured over 40% of Cleo’s shares prior to announcing the takeover, the offer 
process was a formality. Immediately following closing of the offer, all of Cleo’s existing 
board members resigned and Antony nominated a fresh slate of directors, including the 
first author. The new board got down to reviewing Cleo’s operations and there followed a 
“stagnant” period of about six months. Suddenly in September 1995, Cleo’s chairman 
called a special board meeting at which he proposed the appointment of three senior 
board directors to head up Cleo. He told Cleo’s board that he had handpicked all three 
executives and that they had already started work in the company. 
 
The appointment of the three new executives coincided with Cleo’s announcement of its 
first operating loss as a quoted company. This loss seemed to usher in a period of radical 
corporate restructuring which affected all operating areas in Cleo. The radical nature of 
restructuring was epitomized by a new corporate logo and a new mission statement. 
Above all, the new chairman took personal charge of Cleo, and external stakeholders 
including Antony no longer had access to any information about Cleo except through 
channels designated by Cleo’s chairman.  
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By mid-1996 Cleo had substantially completed its internal restructuring. Staff 
resignations declined and Cleo’s share price stabilized. However, the apparent calm 
dissolved on 8th June 1996 when press articles reported the Cleo chairman’s proposed 
“Golden Parachute”. This so-called “Parachute” was a contractual clause which formed 
an integral part of the chairman’s new service contract; the “Parachute” would open 
automatically if the chairman’s contract were prematurely terminated, in which event 
Cleo would be obliged to pay its chairman S$ 7,000,000 (circa US$ 4,350,000 at 
exchange rates prevailing at the time). While initial press reports repeated the facts of the 
“Golden Parachute” based on Cleo’s own announcements, one powerful press columnist 
published a scathing commentary of the chairman’s motives for his “Golden Parachute”. 
Further adverse press commentary followed.  Antony now faced severe pressure from its 
banks who threatened to cut their financial backing. 
 
Antony scheduled a board meeting to discuss the looming crisis. Cleo’s chairman was 
unable to attend, but the meeting took place nonetheless. At the meeting several of 
Antony’s directors voiced their unhappiness with Cleo’s chairman. Critically, however, 
Antony’s board unanimously resolved to continue backing the chairman. Given the 
public perception that Antony had always acted in concert with Cleo’s chairman, 
Antony’s directors were caught in an impasse: regardless of whether they now 
disapproved of the chairman, they were unable to disassociate themselves publicly from 
his behavior. 
  
Principal Dramatis Personae 
Antony’s chairman, an Indonesian Chinese, was the single largest shareholder of Antony 
and had bought into Antony in 1990. He had turned around Antony and  built it up into a 
diversified operation which formed the cornerstone of his business empire. Antony’s 
chairman was appointed Cleo’s deputy chairman following the takeover. 
Cleo’s new chairman, a Singaporean Chinese, was a well known entrepreneur who had 
received multiple honors from the Singapore government. He was a director of a number 
of quoted companies worldwide and sat on government statutory committees.  
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Antony’s MD, a chartered accountant, was a close associate of Antony’s chairman and 
had been Antony’s MD since its takeover in 1990. 
Antony’s ED was a Member of the Singapore Parliament and a qualified accountant. 
Although he headed up Antony’s finance and administration, Antony’s directors did not 
nominate him to the board of Cleo. 
Antony’s audit committee chairman was an eminent lawyer who took over the 
chairmanship of the audit committee from the first author shortly after the takeover. He 
was originally nominated to Antony’s board of directors by Cleo’s new chairman. 
The first author was appointed by Cleo’s board as “Group Executive Director” heading 
up Treasury & Corporate Development. He was also a non-executive director of Antony 
throughout Cleo’s restructuring and he remains a non-executive director of Antony. His 
is the main voice narrating the “Battle in the Boardroom” . 
 
Battle in the Boardroom 
We present Cleo’s post-takeover restructuring in three sequential periods: a transition 
period of about six months immediately following the takeover in March 1995, when 
nothing significant changed; an implementation stage of about nine months from 
September 1995, when almost every part of the company’s business and operations 
experienced some change; and the outcome of reengineering stage from mid-1996, when 
Cleo declared that “changes in organization, systems, and procedures have been 
successfully implemented (Cleo 1996 Annual Report, p.5).” This temporal organization 
is based on the “plot” of the evolving power struggle which we used to assign meanings 
to various texts and related events. Following Bruner (1986, 1990) and Pentland (1999, 
p.712-716) we ensure that our  research story displays various distinct features of “good” 
narratives. Above all, we have structured our story sequentially. We identify each of our 
focal characters and try to preserve the polyvocality of their stories (identifiable 
narrative voice). At the end of our story we elaborate on the evaluative context in which 
various discursive performances take place. 
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The post-takeover transition stage 
In the post takeover transition phase, we identify three distinct narratives from the texts 
we reviewed. The most dominant narrative proved to be the official story which Cleo’s 
management put out through Cleo’s communications department. This narrative tells of 
an incremental change process controlled by Cleo’s management. By “dominant” we 
mean that this story seemed to be able to attract stakeholders both within and outside 
Cleo who took for granted its veracity and acted, spoke, and wrote on the basis of Cleo’s 
announcements and other public information. In contrast, Antony’s public story tried to 
present a confident public image of its efforts to manage Cleo’s restructuring. We 
designated Antony’s discourse as “weaker” because it had far less discernible impact on 
its intended audience. We can also discern at this stage an emerging internal discourse 
building up the reputation of Cleo’s chairman. There were still other identifiable 
narratives during this stage, although they appear less structured. The existence of a 
multiplicity of narratives before restructuring got under way seemed to reflect the social 
dynamics of an organization-in-flux in which powerful corporate individuals jostled for 
position against one another.  
 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
 
Building on his public reputation, Cleo’s chairman began a series of discursive 
performances in board meetings at both Antony and Cleo. The purpose of the 
performances seemed to be to win over the support of directors, particularly on Antony’s 
board. The kind of support that Cleo’s chairman sought appeared to be intensely personal 
in that he probed for ways to develop a sense of personal loyalty to himself.  By 
developing a “taken for granted” sense of power he aimed to assuage doubts about his 
proposed actions. 
 
One of the first such actions was to establish a general understanding among Antony’s 
directors to “leave it to him” to manage Cleo without interference from Antony. In the 
following extract, the Cleo chairman’s fellow directors warmed to his apparent sagacity 
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and Antony’s audit committee chairman ended up endorsing the Cleo chairman’s 
reputation:  
“[Audit Committee Chairman] said he supported [the Cleo Chairman’s] view... [the Cleo Chairman] was 
way beyond our experience in managing turnaround situations and if anything goes wrong it would be left 
to [Cleo’s chairman] to pick up the pieces. As [Cleo’s Chairman] has all the credentials for the job, 
[Antony’s ED] said the least the directors could do was to offer him the board’s full support for a 
reasonable length of time... [Audit Chairman] supported this view and said the directors should leave it to 
[Cleo’s Chairman] and not discuss strategy at this stage (Antony board minutes, 04/1995, emphasis 
added).” 
 
There seemed no better endorsement of the Cleo chairman’s reputation than a statement 
from the most senior independent director of Antony which brought to the board’s 
attention its own inexperience in managing turnaround situations. The continuing vote of 
confidence in Cleo’s chairman given by Antony’s audit committee chief assuaged any 
doubts directors had about the chairman’s actions: for the time being, Antony’s ED was 
prepared to give him the benefit of any doubt and “to offer the chairman [his] full 
support”. In retrospect, this bought vital time for Cleo’s chairman to push through his 
own agenda; having secured the support of Antony’s board, he could focus his attention 
on his chosen task without needing to divert his energies elsewhere. 
 
In contrast, the performances of Antony’s chairman at board meetings were 
unimpressive. As an Indonesian, he seemed socially disadvantaged in that some board 
members held a preconceived view of Indonesians as “short-term traders”, while Cleo’s 
chairman was credited with a “long-term” investment outlook. This prejudice was 
reflected in the way Antony’s chairman struggled for the attention of his board 
colleagues: 
“[Antony] chairman said we must continue with the original plan to move Cleo forward. He was against 
giving any card blanch [sic.] to run Cleo. He said that as we invested millions we should... take out the 
fruits of our labor as soon as possible... [Cleo’s chairman] said we must take a long-term view and 
proposed that we first look at Cleo’s business and try and understand the business before acting.  [Antony] 
chairman said this was just his point and said we should immediately start looking into Cleo from the inside 
as originally planned (Antony board minutes, 08/1995).” 
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The Antony chairman’s position was further undermined by deprecating rumors about his 
amateurish (“John Wayne”) style of management: 
“OK, now I remember after they heard the [Indonesian] chairman was taking over, [Divisional Directors] 
made [computer] printouts and they put this John Wayne cowboy picture of [Antony’s chairman] on the 
tables. I think they put [up] six or seven pictures on a stand and one lunchtime some of the boys took out a 
water gun and they all tried [in turn] to shoot down all the pictures in one go. Yeah it was all a prank [but] I 
didn’t see it I only heard about it... no no I can’t remember who spread this rumor (Interview with Cleo’s 
Finance Controller, 15/02/1999).” 
Most damaging, however, to the Antony chairman’s reputation was the performance of 
Antony’s own directors who aired their support of Cleo’s chairman rather than of their 
own. This support weakened the story put out by Antony’s board that Antony’s 
managers, rather than Cleo’s, were directing the course of restructuring because it 
appeared that they did not believe in their own ability to control the restructuring. As the 
two chairmen fought, Cleo’s line managers received cross signals about the restructuring.  
Predictably, they took a “wait-and-see” attitude, and the restructuring process stalled. 
 
Implementation stage 
The first operating loss in Cleo’s public history reported in September 1995 signaled a 
marked change in its re-engineering efforts. As this loss was recorded on significantly 
increased turnover, Cleo’s board of directors felt there was an urgent need for significant 
internal changes. For the chairman the loss  seemed to inspire a greater effort to gain 
exclusive, personal control of Cleo. This was evidenced in various powerful, discursive 
performances at Cleo board meetings: at a specially convened board meeting on 14th 
October 1995, Cleo’s chairman declared, in the presence of Antony’s chairman, that he 
had “handpicked” three new senior managers to run Cleo, and after a brief summary of 
each manager’s C.V., he asked the new directors immediately to join the same board 
meeting. In fact, the three new managers had already started work in Cleo several days 
previous to the board meeting: the board minutes revealed that organizational changes 
had already been implemented, apparently on the Cleo chairman’s personal authority, and 
he reported the fait accompli in a discursive tour de force : 
“[Cleo’s] chairman reported that [named CEO] and [named 2 Dy CEOs] had been approached to fill 
respective vacancies. All 3 had accepted the offers made to them and have been introduced to Heads [of 
Departments]... chairman said that he would like to propose the names of the 3 executives as board 
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Directors... chairman said that it was now necessary to bite the bullet with the internal restructuring. There 
was no time to waste because we had already lost a lot of opportunities in the market. He said any 
restructuring should not take more than 3 or 4 months to complete and in all other companies he had been 
involved with the speed of restructuring was essential [to its success]. In company X [controlled by Cleo’s 
chairman], he had brought in a new MD well before the start of restructuring and the new chief had been 
very professional... chairman said that if only we had been allowed to do this the company would have 
saved a lot of time and we all know time is money (Cleo board minutes, 14/10/1995, emphasis added).” 
 
After the chairman’s command performance, the minutes do not reflect substantial further 
discussion; board participants, including the participant author, were stunned into silence. 
By late 1995 Cleo’s chairman began dictating the pace and nature of change, and other 
directors and managers appeared to be trying to keep up with his restructuring plan.  The 
chairman’s handpicked managers appeared to control the input to various narratives on 
his behalf, and other managers and employees were found to be jockeying for position 
within narratives traceable to the chairman. 
 
At the same time as he was conducting board-level performances to win over fellow 
directors, the Cleo chairman was also trying to win the support of the company’s line 
managers, and through them rank-and-file employees. This was an important part of the 
Cleo chairman’s strategy, because by winning over line managers Antony could not exert 
any direct influence over the company’s operations. The Cleo management’s various staff 
offers can be interpreted as attempts (“carrots”) to try and gain support from line 
managers. But there was also a hidden agenda of continuing control of the same line 
managers which was evidenced by the “stick” of heightened expenditure policy and 
operating restrictions.  
 
The following table shows three separate and contrasting narratives during the 
implementation stage. As in the transition stage, these narratives competed for the 
attention of Cleo’s most important stakeholders.  
 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
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Cleo’s success in telling a good story which stuck in the minds of public stakeholders can 
be gauged by continuing favorable press reports4. Secondly, Cleo’s chairman continued 
to enjoy the unanimous support of Cleo’s board of directors. Unlike Antony’s board 
minutes during this period, Cleo’s board minutes seemed to display a sense of urgency to 
complete Cleo’s restructuring. Antony’s board in response could only applaud Cleo’s 
actions: “The board supports Cleo’s restructuring efforts which should now be completed 
as soon as possible (Antony board minutes, 29/09/1995)”. While still trying to maintain a 
public appearance that they were in control of Cleo, Antony’s senior directors developed 
a sense of helplessness at their inability to influence Cleo. Antony’s loss of control was 
the Cleo chairman’s gain, although his quest for power continued to be couched in 
language which suggested that he was working primarily to benefit Cleo: 
“[Cleo’s chairman] told the board... [that] the new Cleo managers were loyal to the company... he had full 
confidence that they will carry out their duties in the best interest of the company (Antony  board minutes, 
14/10/1995).” 
 
Outcome of change stage 
Cleo’s “spin doctors” continued to impress the story of a successful restructuring: 
“The [Cleo] Group has been restructured to focus on five main business areas... [the consequence of which 
is that its] operating divisions have been able to serve customers with improved efficiency and quality... 
[the Group] won a record number of projects [in 1996] (Cleo 1997 Annual Report and Accounts, p.14).” 
By now the Cleo chairman had succeeded in gaining exclusive control of the company. 
This seemed clear from Cleo’s public actions: her operators started tendering for many 
projects in partnership with the chairman’s private organization and without Antony’s 
involvement. This contradicted Antony’s publicized aim at the time of takeover to 
facilitate a “synergy” of activities between the two companies (cf. Antony Takeover 
Circular, 02/1995). Despite their frustration, Antony’s managers felt helpless to act. An 
indication of how deeply Antony felt about its failure to work with Cleo was that years 
after the relationship had ended, the failure continued to unsettle Antony’s MD: 
“We are supposed to be one group together synergizing remember? ...I paid millions for the company 
[Cleo] and I [got] chickenfeed from you (Interview with Antony’s MD, 22/12/1998).” 
As market analysts forecasted Cleo’s return to profitability, the press ran an article 
charging that Cleo had “sweetened the service contract for [its] chairman with a generous 
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golden parachute of up to S$ 7,000,000”.  It was “the first time such a device has been 
used by a public listed company in Singapore (“The Straits Times”, 08/06/1996, p.40).” It 
appeared that Cleo’s chairman did not consult Antony’s directors about his new service 
contract – despite Antony having to pay for the chairman’s parachute if they were to fire 
him (cf. Antony board minutes, 17/06/1996). 
 
By this stage the Cleo chairman’s story had fused with Cleo’s “public story”. Cleo’s 
chairman had successfully mobilized the active consent of Cleo’s stakeholders in 
developing a storyline which his audience took for granted as the dominant storyline. 
None of his opponents were able to dominate a particular discourse in the way Cleo’s 
chairman did5. By comparison, Antony’s chairman proved to be an ineffective storyteller: 
his performances failed to persuade his listeners to back his story. The most important 
group of listeners were Antony’s bankers who started voicing their unhappiness that 
Antony had lost control of its largest investment:  
“[Antony’s MD] brought to the board’s attention… Antony might be adversely affected and Antony might 
not be able to obtain refinancing facility to carry on... the scenario of receivers being called in cannot be 
ruled out (Antony board minutes, 17/06/1996).” 
Antony’s story became usurped by a public story about Antony’s inability to play a 
meaningful role in Cleo: 
“Who can stop [Cleo’s chairman]? ...Antony can as the company’s biggest shareholder, and the fact that it 
hasn’t so far done so does not reflect well on any of those involved in this unsavory episode (“The Straits 
Times”, 08/06/1996)”. 
 
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
 
Antony’s continuing dissatisfaction with being excluded from Cleo’s management 
reached an extreme point when Antony’s directors, including those who had previously 
supported Cleo’s chairman, summoned an emergency board meeting to censure him. 
Antony’s board minutes of 17th June 1996 revealed that Antony had been consistently 
denied management information about Cleo despite repeated requests, and the blockage 
resulted in a scenario in which Cleo seemed to be dictating not only its own future but 
that of Antony as well: 
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Antony’s MD : “You know you were there so why are you asking me all these things. It was such a big deal 
to get anything from you. I just didn’t understand all these games you people were playing. It was the real 
thing you know, no fooling around.  My banks went crazy and I looked to you for info [about the golden 
parachute] and I kept asking you to get the info. You know my banks and everybody said stop. But you 
refused to stop (long pause). I felt so helpless because I couldn’t do anything and I remember I kept calling 
and calling [you] and remember what you said to me what (pause) you didn’t have it. So I thought why the 
**** am I keeping you there?” 
Interviewer (Wilson Ng): “Look [Antony MD] you know I was an employee of the company [Cleo] and 
[Cleo Chairman] was my chairman. Our clear understanding was that if you wanted me to do any secret 
stuff for you...” 
Antony’s MD : “[interrupts] What secret stuff?  What was so secret about telling me [in advance] before the 
parachute thing blew up (Interview with Antony’s MD, 22/12/1998)?” 
 
As a result of the “Golden Parachute” incident, Antony’s directors tried, albeit belatedly, 
to mount a rearguard action against Cleo’s chairman. Whereas previously Cleo’s 
chairman had won over supporters in both Antony and Cleo, he alienated most of the 
Antony board with his handling of the “Golden Parachute” incident. Antony’s ED was 
particularly irked that he had not even been informed in advance of the story leaking in 
the press : 
“Dear [Antony chairman] 
[Antony MD] and I discussed the Straits Times and Business Times newspaper article on the proposal to 
give [Cleo chairman] the golden parachute in his service contract... The article seems to imply that consent 
has been given by our board and that Antony is the concerted party with [Cleo chairman]. Today’s article in 
the Business Times confirms our initial fears. [Antony MD] said that he has not given consent either as a 
director of Antony or Cleo. I am not aware of this except from the newspapers and I do not know if J is 
aware of this (Memo to Antony’s chairman, 8/06/1996).” 
 
The board minutes of Antony and Cleo during this period suggest that Cleo’s chairman 
paid no attention to Antony’s concerns. How can one read the relative lack of discursive 
performances by Cleo’s chairman? As Cleo’s chairman had achieved his personal 
objective and had seized control of Cleo it appeared that he thereafter simply lost interest 
in performing publicly, a skill which he had carefully nurtured previously.  Cleo’s board 
minutes during the outcome stage were written up in a new terse, matter-of-fact style 
which contrasted with minutes during the transition stage which often gave a detailed, 
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“blow-by-blow” account of board discussions. The change in writing style reflected the 
generally calmer tone of Cleo’s board meetings once the chairman had taken absolute 
control.  Consequently, in the outcome stage, there were less discursive performances 
recorded, and the minutes became less interesting from a narrative perspective. Perhaps 
the most notable consequence of the new style of board minutes was that there appeared 
no record of board members putting up any opposing view to Cleo’s chairman once he 
had spoken and stated his views. 
 
Epilogue 
Ultimately, there was a price to pay for the Cleo chairman’s failure to keep up his 
discursive performances as the discord between the chiefs at Antony and Cleo continued 
to simmer. The Cleo chairman’s seemingly unassailable position was undone in a matter 
of weeks after Antony sold its controlling stake in Cleo without prior consultation with 
Cleo’s chairman. While the sale might have been a predictable outcome of his victory, 
Cleo’s chairman did not bargain for the uncertainty that resulted from Antony’s sale to a 
son of the-then Indonesian President Suharto. All of Antony’s representatives on Cleo’s 
board, including the first author, resigned following the sale. A few weeks later Cleo’s 
chairman himself sold out of Cleo. But he jumped without his parachute. Stalemate, or 
more precisely, double checkmate.  
 
The interpretative moment 
Story interpretation requires an answer to the deceptively simple question: “Why did 
things turn out the way they did?”  In constructing our answer we will turn to the 
effective use of poetic tropes by the Cleo chairman.  Our sensemaking can be further 
improved by exploring the deeper discursive and social structures in which both 
storyteller and audience were situated, and through which the very possibility of 
intentional communication is both enabled and constrained (cf. Heracleous and Hendry, 
2000).  In doing so we establish a difference between text and context.  Indeed, not 
everything can be reduced to discourse and narrative, and the efficacy of the chairman’s 
performances can be seen to depend on a clever exploitation of the interplay between 
discursive practice and social practice. 
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Poetic tropes 
In our story we have shown how the turbulence of organizational change presents 
situational opportunities for corporate actors to assert sectarian interests by trying to 
impose their story as the one others should live by. The Cleo chairman succeeded in 
moulding organizational events in a distinct and individual way through the use of poetic 
tropes which were reinforced through distinctive performances in the board room. 
Particular powerful tropes he employed were attribution of causal connection (linking 
various incidents as cause and effect), attribution of responsibility (determines whether 
an individual will be cast in the role of villain, victim or hero), and attribution of fixed 
qualities (juxtaposition of two people or situations whose qualities are meant to be exact 
opposites)6. Poetic tropes were combined through story-work to generate complex 
narrative constructions out of simple events (viz. the three tables we presented earlier).  
 
The tropes of attribution of blame and credit and attribution of responsibility are most 
evident in the Cleo chairman’s astute development of his identity as corporate savior 
without equal, even leaving it to others to contribute narrative fragments underlining his 
experience and reputation (see table 1, narrative 2).  This great experience was then 
successfully juxtaposed with the inexperience of turnaround situations and the “short-
term trader” reputation of the Antony chairman (cf. deprecating “John Wayne” rumours). 
Through opposition qualities become both fixed and exaggerated, thus legitimizing or 
delegitimizing respectively any future actions. The respective performances of the 
protagonists served to reinforce the effect of the poetic tropes used by the Cleo chairman. 
 
The Cleo chairman was also very successful in representing actions and events as 
necessary rather than accidental or conditional.  Establishing orderly sequences of causes 
and effect is a powerful means of organizing and rationalizing remembered experiences 
(Gabriel, 2000).  The simple chain of causes and effects which appeared seamlessly 
linked together looked something like this: Cleo records its first ever operating loss; 
therefore we have to take drastic action/there is no time to waste, therefore I appoint three 
handpicked managers (whom had started work before the board approved the 
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appointment); it is now time to bite the bullet with internal restructuring (subtext: …so do 
not oppose my actions); if only we had been allowed to do this the company would have 
saved a lot of money (post-hoc legitimation, also see table 2, narrative 2).  All the other 
directors could do once they had bought into the story was applaud the Cleo chairman.   
 
Discursive and social structures 
But why did the chairman’s discursive performances have such a powerful and 
permanent grip over the Cleo and Antony board members?  To further refine our answer 
we have to explore how particular storytelling performances draw from discursive 
structures of communicational legitimacy or appropriateness in local contexts.  Individual 
narratives are always situated within specific social, cultural, and institutional discourses 
(Hardy and Phillips, 1999) and the efficacy of stories is inseparable from culturally and 
historically shared conventions about language and the hearing of stories (Atkinson and 
Coffey, 1997).  Following the concept of the Ricœurian speech act, we treat the social 
context of production and reception as a resource for the creation and manifestation of 
meaning, not simply as a structural constraint on the possibility of meaning more 
structural approaches would suggest (cf. Heracleous and Hendry, 2000).  
 
The key contextual clue in our story is the ethnic Chinese make-up of Cleo’s directors.  
The efficacy of the chairman’s performances depended upon the receptiveness of 
listeners to particular archetypal relationship-driven themes, chiefly patriarchal role-
playing and personal loyalty which, together with other relationship themes (e.g., filial 
piety), have served as an important overarching framework (“life orientation”) for socio-
cultural behavior in Chinese societies (Tu, 1994, p.15). The selective use of Chinese 
themes proved to be an extremely effective rhetorical strategy which had strong 
legitimizing effects by representing sectional interests as universal and transmuting 
contradictions (cf. Wilkinson, 1996, p.439). Board members and managers rallied around 
their chairman after he successfully convinced them that, given his unmatched business 
reputation and commanding performances, he was best-suited to play the role of Cleo’s 
patriarch. In appropriating the traditional, institutionalized role of a dominant sage-
patriarch, any opposition or dissent could be construed as disloyal and hence morally 
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unacceptable. The Singaporean context in which the discursive performances took place 
was fundamentally receptive to the appropriation of this authoritative organizational role 
(Haley and Low, 1998). This archetypal theme was so powerful in establishing a power 
base because it used actors’ most deeply ingrained preconscious conceptions of the 
structuring of social processes, an observation not necessarily unique to the Singaporean 
context.  Sköldberg (1994), for example, found in a Scandinavian context that “regardless 
of change problematic, organizations are liable rather to follow the dictates of narrative 
traditions than either ‘objective’ structures of problems and power, or demands of shared 
symbolisms (p.236).”  In this sense “the world of fiction leads us to the heart of the real 
world of action (Ricœur, 1983, p.296).” 
 
The formal, regulated setting of  a board room setting imposes specific modes of 
discourse that senior organizational actors have to employ in order for their opinions and 
argumentations to be seen as legitimate and worth attention. The Cleo chairman, in 
establishing a “right” to the dominant discourse (through effective use of poetic tropes 
and exploiting archetypal themes) could effectively frame the strategies of action of other 
board members. Once a dominant discourse began to emerge, board members tried to 
translate it for their own needs and situate themselves within this discourse.  In a sense, 
the chairman successfully crafted for himself an avuncular role beyond his executive role 
and other directors, even those who had initially opposed him, acknowledged that he was 
better suited to “save” Cleo, even if saving the company meant that the chairman got 
what he wanted by effectively denying Antony any further management involvement in 
its largest investment. 
 
The above should not lead us to see storytelling as automatically dissolving facts.   We do 
well to heed Keenoy et al.’s  (1997) observation that much research on organizational 
discourse has been decidedly two-dimensional, in that it has tended to consider text and 
discursive practice but has ignored social practice.   In our case study, Cleo’s chairman 
used his hierarchical position to create an operating structure where newly appointed 
managers were personally loyal to him and he appropriated sole control of information 
flows, which ultimately allowed him to “have his way”.  This may seem nothing more 
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than an application of “old fashioned” legitimate power.   However, the chairman could 
only engage in these actions after establishing discursive legitimacy (cf. Hardy and 
Phillips, 1998) through the storytelling performances described above.   Indeed, his 
formal power as a minority shareholder was far less than that of Antony’s chairman as 
majority shareholder after the takeover.  Even during the “implementation” stage the 
Cleo chairman’s actions could have been undone by board colleagues of equally 
distinctive positional authority (e.g., key managerial appointments had to be approved by 
board directors), but the chairman headed off his opponents by further legitimizing his 
actions in carefully crafted discursive performances.  
 
Reflecting on our story 
This article has at its core a story. Whilst there exist some historical examples of 
academic papers where a story is central (e.g., Jermier, 1985; Hines, 1988), recently there 
has been a surge in such approaches. Often the story is accompanied by interpretation 
(Mintzberg and Westley, 2000; Rhodes, 2000; Watson, 2000), but this is not always the 
case (Akin, 2000; van Iterson, 2000).  These contributions seem quite congruent with the 
sober and chastened approach to knowledge generation that Alvesson and Deetz (2000) 
see as typical of critical research: “These knowledges are ‘accountable to an audience’ 
rather than ‘provable within a formal system’…  A conversation should not prevent 
evaluation, critique and challenge, but be, generally speaking, open to the possibility that 
everything is less stable and clear-cut than it seems and is, therefore, open for discussion 
and reconsideration (p.135).”  This approach chimes with Wittgenstein’s warning against 
the danger of wanting to make fine distinctions.  What we have rather to do is accept the 
everyday language-game and, “What’s ragged should be left ragged” (Wittgenstein, 1980 
– a remark that was identified as from c. 1944). This could be construed as complacency 
or resignation, but it might also be construed that the ragged is sometimes to be preferred 
to the smooth (Flathman, 2000).  If this article is to act as inspiration for future research, 
we hope it does so in its adherence to the often rough but serviceable ground of day-to-
day thinking and acting, plotting and practicing.  We did what we could to clarify the 
story for ourselves and the reader, but we do not entertain the idea that the story’s 
raggedness could or should be eliminated. 
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Despite the professed emphasis of narrative approaches on organizations-embedded-in-
practices and the unfolding of events over time (Czarniawska, 1997; Pentland, 1999; 
Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997), inadequate consideration of context and temporality has 
been a persistent issue in organizational discourse analysis (Heracleous and Hendry, 
2000). Researchers often proceed to study the reified results of a construction process that 
is never revealed (Czarniawska, 1999; Alvesson and Deetz, 2000).  The process of 
construction has been very much a central concern in this paper. In particular, using the 
experience and ongoing involvement of the principal author in board processes, we 
present an insider’s view of how managers linguistically structure the world. Because 
managers are used to telling and hearing stories as perhaps the prime sensemaking device 
for managing people (Shaw et al., 1998; Weick, 1995, 1999), the narrative approach can 
be a powerful tool for bridging the traditional researcher-practitioner gap. Yet, we have 
no intention to tell managers how to restructure an organization or how to behave in the 
boardroom. Neither is there a need to provide law-like theories with their attractive 
elegance and highly glossed accounts, the usefulness of which remains very suspect 
(Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). We simply wanted to tell a complex story of 
storytelling, with human actors busying themselves with plotting, performing, accounting 
for what they do, and thus producing reality as they know it.  Our interpretation functions 
as a meta-account on the importance of storytelling and is meant to guide the 
sensemaking process of both managers-practitioners and academics-practitioners, but we 
certainly do not want to impose a “correct” reading.  
 
It is a difficult challenge for authors-cum-storytellers to not privilege their point of view, 
and be self-reflexive about the ways in which they select textual fragments and 
recontextualise their meaning in a write-up.  Whilst we do recognise the need for 
reflexivity, we are very reluctant to produce an “innovative” account to deal with this 
issue. The idea that reflexivity might come about as the result of some specific 
combination of techniques drawn from a set of standardized reflexive devices (such as 
including “the authors” in the text or establishing feedback loops with informants, e.g. 
see Boje et al. 1999) is unlikely to prove satisfactory because it pays little attention to the 
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concept of reader and it retains a naive belief in the possibility of writing truer texts (De 
Cock, 2000).  Woolgar (1988) suggested we therefore develop an understanding of a 
research text as an element in a reader-text community.  
 
If we accept Woolgar’s advice, it follows that this article is subject to the potential for 
multiple readings7. Any given reading may not be “the best”, but it may be better at 
achieving particular effects than would be achieved by other types of readings (Rhodes, 
2000). For example, whilst we have focused on stories and discourse in this article, 
readers with an interest in corporate governance may put different emphases. In the 
context of a paucity of field-based studies examining the behavior of, and relationships 
between, top managers and directors in organizations (Golden-Biddle and Hayagreeva, 
1997; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), our account of behavioral dynamics in the 
boardroom offers “close-up” insights which these readers can reconstruct and connect 
differently to make them personally useful.   There exists also only a limited body of field 
research conducted in companies located in the Pacific Rim (Kaghan et al., 1999), largely 
because of the difficulty of extracting primary source material from Asian managers 
about their organizations (Kim, 1997).  Readers with an interest in Asian management 
practices, while not interested in narratives per se, may therefore find our story 
memorable and reconnect particular elements which they may find peculiar to the Asian 
environment (such as patriarchal role playing) in ways they find useful. 
 
 
Finally, our story, whilst being contextually shaped by the Singapore environment, is 
nonetheless not confined to this particular environment. The role of storytelling as a 
powerful concept has been noted across cultural, temporal, and other boundaries (Gabriel, 
2000; Goshal et al., 1999). Taking a recent European example, during our revision of this 
paper a different boardroom story emerged when the Financial Times reported on its 
front page the “Vodafone chief’s £10m bonus” (FT, 20/06/2000). Vodafone’s board of 
directors approved the award of a £10m bonus to Chris Gent, the chief executive, as 
reward for organizing the company’s £113bn takeover of Mannesmann, only half of 
which would be subject to performance conditions8. In a further article, “A real sporting 
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gent with a nice line, too, in storytelling” (FT, 20/06/2000, p.30), Gent’s skill as 
“raconteur” was singled out as “an important deciding factor” in gaining control of 
Mannesmann. Given our boardroom-centered approach in this paper, what is of 
additional interest is the way Vodafone’s chief executive might have deployed his 
storytelling skills to persuade fellow directors (including members of the powerful 
remuneration committee) to go out of their way to make a vast payment to him at a time 
when there seemed no apparent need to do so and then to have to defend their actions 
publicly. Whilst we are unlikely to learn how this happened unless a board participant 
speaks out publicly, the FT’s report of Gent’s storytelling skills emphasizes the 
importance of discursive performances in enabling senior corporate officers to “get their 
own way”.   
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Table 1: Competing Narratives “Transition” Stage 
 
  
 
Narrative 1: Dominant 
CLEO’S OFFICIAL 
PUBLIC STORY: 
Narrative 2: Emerging 
CLEO CHAIRMAN’S 
STORY (INTERNAL) 
Narrative 3: Competing 
for Dominance 
ANTONY’S OFFICAL 
PUBLIC STORY: 
Incremental change process 
controlled by Cleo’s 
management 
Building up Cleo 
chairman’s reputation 
Antony controls its 
subsidiary and manages its 
restructuring 
Stock Exchange releases convey 
impression of an organized 
change program controlled by 
Cleo’s management: 
“The [Cleo] Group has 
successfully undertaken an 
extensive program to review and 
restructure its operations to be 
more competitive (Cleo 
announcement of 1996 results, 
29/03/1997) 
  
Cleo chairman’s performances at 
board meetings develops his own 
reputation as a corporate savior 
without equal:  
“[Cleo chairman’s] experience 
was than an engineering 
operation like Cleo was 
worthwhile because of the quality 
of its staff” (Antony board 
minutes, 13/04/1995) 
Antony’s public documents 
suggest that Antony is 
orchestrating Cleo’s restructuring 
process: 
“Upon completion of the offer, 
Antony will undertake a detailed 
review of the operations and 
business of the Cleo group with 
the assistance of the current 
management of Cleo” (Antony 
takeover circular, 09/03/1995) 
 
Cleo’s public texts (reports, 
circulars) suggest slow but 
controlled progress: 
“1995 has proved a difficult 
year… but the [Cleo] Group has 
managed to make substantial 
progress in its reorganization 
efforts through proper planning 
and staff Cupertino (Chairman’s 
statement, Cleo 1995 Annual 
Report, p.5) 
Cleo chairman’s experience and 
reputation story:  
“As [Cleo Chairman] has all the 
credentials for the job, Mr. T said 
the least the directors could do 
was to offer him the board’s full 
support” (Antony board minutes, 
12/04/1995) 
Antony board minutes suggest 
Antony wanted to slow down the 
pace of change:  
“We should not commit ourselves 
to something we cannot get out of 
later” 
“[Antony] chairman said we must 
continue with the original plan to 
move the company forward.  He 
was against giving any card 
blanch [sic] to run Cleo” (Antony 
board minutes, 15/02/1995)  
Cleo-sourced staff figures 
showed generally low staff 
turnover throughout the 
restructuring which supported the 
“professionally-managed” 
success declared by Cleo’s 
management. 
Cleo’s senior managers support 
deprecating rumors about 
Antony’s chairman: 
“[Divisional Directors] made 
[computer] printouts and put this 
John Wayne cowboy picture of 
[Antony Chairman] on the tables. 
I think they put [up] six or seven 
pictures on a stand and one 
lunchtime some of the boys took 
out a water gun and they all tried 
[in turn] to shoot down all the 
pictures in one go” (Cleo FC 
interview, 15/02/1999) 
Professional treatment of media: 
“Antony’s chairman attended [an 
arranged meeting with analysts] 
and participated in the question 
and answer session [on the 
restructuring] (JM Sassoon 
stockbrokers’ report, June 1996) 
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Table 2: Competing Narratives “Implementation” Stage 
 
 
Narrative 1: Dominant 
CLEO’S OFFICIAL 
PUBLIC STORY 
Narrative 2: Strengthening 
CLEO CHAIRMAN’S 
STORY (INTERNAL) 
Narrative 3: Weakening 
ANTONY’S OFFICIAL 
PUBLIC STORY 
Cleo’s management 
orchestrates radical and 
authoritative response to 
poor financial results 
Cleo Chairman is taking 
personal control of Cleo 
Antony tries vainly to 
control Cleo’s managers 
Cleo public announcements: 
“The board announces an 
operating loss of S$4.238 million 
for the six months ended 30th 
June of 1995… this represents a 
353% decline from the previous 
period.  In response to [this 
unprecedented] loss, the company 
will undertake immediate 
measures to reverse the decline” 
(Cleo announcement, 
30/09/1995)   
Domineering performance by 
Cleo chairman: 
“Chairman said that he would like 
to propose the names of 3 
executives as board directors with 
immediate effect and that he 
wished to introduce them [to the 
meeting]” 
“Chairman said that it was now 
necessary to bite the bullet with 
the internal restructuring.” (Cleo 
board minutes, 14/10/1995) 
Antony public announcements 
suggest “normal upgrading” at 
Cleo: 
“Since Cleo was in a fast-moving 
industry… should it not follow 
that Antony should contribute 
whatever expertise it could to 
help Cleo stay ahead of the game” 
(Antony ED, “Business Times”, 
16/02/1996).  
Antony board support for Cleo: 
“The board supports Cleo’s 
restructuring efforts which should 
now be completed as soon as 
possible (Antony board minutes, 
29/09/1995) 
Antony chairman’s poor 
discursive performances in 
Antony board meetings weakens 
his board support and strengthens 
that of Cleo’s chairman 
 
Antony management attempts to 
control Cleo’s restructuring: 
“[Antony chairman] believed 
Cleo’s operating policies had to 
be brought into line with 
Antony’s...  It was bad practice to 
let subsidiaries dictate policy to 
the Group (Antony board 
minutes, 29/09/1995) 
Tight internal Cleo management 
and policy implementation: 
“stick” of  tightened expenditure 
policy with increased reporting 
and expenditure claims procedure 
(Cleo board minutes, 28/09/1995) 
versus-  
“carrot” of extended ESOS 
(employees share option scheme) 
predicated on profits, long service 
and “personal achievements” 
(Cleo Group Share Option 
Scheme, 03/05/1995) 
Restricted information channeled 
only through Cleo management 
hierarchy: 
“It was such a big deal to get 
anything from the company 
[Cleo].  I just didn’t understand all 
these games you people were 
playing (Antony MD interview, 
22/12/1998). 
Antony management’s attempts to 
make sense of Cleo’s radical 
measures:  
“[Group Finance Director] was 
asked to investigate and report 
how [Cleo’s] major competitors 
accounted in their books for 
work-in-progress [to explain 
Cleo’s profit fluctuation]” Antony 
board minutes, 29/09/1995) 
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Table 3: Competing Narratives “Outcome” Stage 
 
Narrative 1: Dominant 
CLEO’S OFFICIAL PUBLIC STORY 
& CHAIRMAN’S STORY HAVE 
MERGED 
Narrative 2: Disintegrating 
STORY MAINLY ABOUT ANTONY 
Cleo chairman takes total control of 
professionally-managed Singapore 
MNC 
Antony totally loses control of Cleo and 
becomes a laughing stock in the market 
“[Antony] bowed to inevitable” by reaffirming 
support for [Cleo] Chairman (Antony board  
minutes, 06/1996) 
 
“The [Antony] board fully supports [Cleo’s 
Chairman] at this difficult period in the 
company’s development” (Antony 
announcement, 07/06/1996)  
 
“RESOLVED THAT the board [of Cleo] accepts 
the appointment of [Cleo’s Chairman] as 
Executive Chairman of the company with 
immediate effect upon terms to be approved by 
the Remunerations Committee”  (Cleo Board 
Resolution, 05/1996 passed by circularization) 
Simmering Antony unhappiness about “little influence 
or control over [Cleo]” (Antony board minutes, 
17/06/1996) 
 
“[Antony’s MD] brought to the board’s attention that if 
[discord with Cleo] continues, Antony might be 
adversely affected and Antony might not be able to 
obtain refinancing facility to carry on... the scenario of 
receivers being called in[to Antony] cannot be ruled 
out” (Antony board minutes, 17/06/1996) 
 
“[I]n light of what has happened, we should hold an 
emergency board meeting to brief the directors on what 
transpired...” (Inter-office Memorandum to Antony’s 
Chairman, 06/1996) 
 
“ I have no idea what [Cleo’s chairman] is up to… we 
should take a stand and explore answers to 
shareholders at the forthcoming AGM (Antony 
chairman’s reply to inter-office memorandum) 
Public Announcements:  
“[Cleo] is pleased to announce that it has 
executed a service  contract with [Cleo’s 
Chairman] to appoint him Executive Chairman 
of the Company under terms and conditions 
which the company’s Remunerations Committee 
has reviewed and approved...” (Cleo SES 
Announcement, 01/06/1996) 
Antony shareholders’ reaction:  
Various “poison pen” letters received (stamped by 
Antony’s CF department dated 16/06/1996 and 
18/06/1996) indicate shareholder unhappiness, inter 
alia, with inability of Antony to control its subsidiary 
and Antony’s lack of management involvement in Cleo 
despite previous announcements to the contrary 
Cleo Public Reports and board minutes show 
Cleo Chairman dominating discourse on Cleo 
board and controlling its decision-making:  
“The Board of Directors [of Cleo] believes that 
the personal involvement of [Cleo’s Chairman] 
in the leadership of the company would enable 
the company to secure large projects in the 
region valued at several billion dollars” (Cleo 
announcement, 07/06/1996)  
 
“It was disclosed that the board of directors and 
representative (sic.) of Antony believe that [Cleo 
Chairman’s] full commitment is imperative for 
the Company’s success” (“Business Times”, 
08/06/1996)  
Press reports: 
“... so what have Antony’s directors got to say about all 
this [the “Golden Parachute” compensation for Cleo’s 
Chairman]? They don’t appear to have given the green 
light to [Cleo’s Chairman , to do what he wants], but if 
they have, the deal might as well be sewn up  (“Hock 
Lock Siew Column”, “Business Times”, 15/06/1996) 
“… we have checked with our investors who have 
expressed their concern at [the golden parachute idea].  
We feel it may be difficult for the company to launch a 
capital market issue at this time (Faxed memorandum 
from Citicorp to Cleo, 15/06/1996) 
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Notes: 
1 “The Straits Times”, 03/03/1995; fictitious names have been substituted for actual 
company names. In order to preserve the relative anonymity of the subject companies we 
have also changed the original dates of publication of all texts while preserving the 
chronological order and time lapses between texts. For example, original documents from 
03/03/1985 and 01/01/1986 could be referred to as 03/06/1995 and 01/04/1996 in our 
analysis. However, interview dates have remained unchanged.   
2 For an alternative view, see Gabriel (1998, 2000) who suggested that by obliterating 
distinctions between stories and other types of texts and narratives, stories lose precisely 
the power they are meant to possess, namely the power to generate and sustain meanings: 
“Storytelling is an art of weaving, of constructing, the product of intimate knowledge.  It 
is a delicate process, a process that can easily break down, failing to live up to its 
promise, disintegrating into mere text (Gabriel, 2000, p.1).” 
3 As one 3M manager recently commented: “Stories are a habit of mind at 3M, and it’s 
through them – through the way they make us see ourselves and our business operations 
in complex, multidimensional forms – that we’re able to discover opportunities for 
strategic change (in Shaw et al., 1998, p. 42).” 
4 Cleo’s share price steadily appreciated through the “implementation” stage of 
restructuring (where it had languished unimpressively during the “transition” phase): 
from a low of S$1.30 in September 1995 (shortly after the start of the “implementation” 
stage) it reached a high of S$1.88 on the eve of the “Golden Parachute” incident in June 
1996, which was over 30% above the previous financial year’s average share price. It 
appeared that Cleo’s shareholders were impressed with the company’s management and 
particularly its chairman who featured regularly in Cleo’s press releases and newspaper 
articles. 
5 A new narrative developed from within Cleo, but it proved unable to mobilize adequate 
support to become as dominant as the chairman’s story. This was despite the fact that the 
internal narrative was well planned and there seemed to be latent unhappiness, especially 
among Cleo’s longer serving staff, about the way Cleo had become “bureaucratic” and 
impersonal. 
6 Gabriel (2000, p.34-42) gives an excellent overview of poetic tropes. 
7 Literary scholars have long accepted that readers always complete novels on their own 
terms.  Reader-response theory (Iser, 1989) criticizes earlier theories that argued that the 
meaning of the text lay solely in its author’s intentions or that meaning was to be found in 
the text alone.  Readers place themselves in the text and then draw on a stock of 
knowledge about the world in order to complete the narrative, filling in details that are 
necessary for understanding but not explicit in the text, thus becoming active constructors 
of meaning (DeVault, 1990).  Meaning is created in the interaction among author, text, 
and reader. 
8 Shareholders were reported to be angry: “Some called it a ‘staggering’ payment for a 
deal whose merits are yet unproven (FT, 20/06/2000, p.30).”  They were unhappy that 
payment of half the £10m bonus in cash with no strings attached seemed to reward 
dealmaking as such rather than shareholder value creation. Vodafone’s board 
subsequently agreed to restructure payment of the cash element of the bonus to better 
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reflect the payee’s future performance (FT, 22-23/07/2000).  “Vodafone said: ‘We hope 
this gesture – whereby Chris will be seen to put the vast majority of his bonus cash into 
Vodafone shares – will be well received by shareholders’ (FT, 25/07/2000, p.25).”   
